This paper looks at how the reputation of a monetary policy making committee is jointly determined with the reputations of its individual members. I ask whether individuals have more or less incentive to gain a reputation for being tough on inflation when they are part of a group. I examine the effect of increased transparency % in the form of publishing the votes of individual members % on individuals' incentives to appear hard nosed. I look at how other institutional features of central banks affect the policy making body's incentive to refrain from inflation.
1 There appears to be little economic research analysing collective reputations. An interesting recent exception is Tirole's (1996) model of corruption in groups with atomistic members.
"And, credibility is the name of the game." Hans Tietmeyer, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, (1999) .
I Introduction
Most models of monetary policy view the policy maker as a single decision maker. In some cases this is reasonable; many central banks are dominated by their chairmen. However, monetary policy is often made by a group. As Blinder (1997) comments, "This institutional "detail" may % and probably does % have important behavioral consequences (page 16)." The intent of this paper is to provide a framework for analysing systematic inflation and reputation building when monetary policy is made by a committee.
I suppose policy makers come in two types. The first is opportunistic and wants to expand output or improve the government's fiscal situation by producing higher than expected inflation. The second is hard-nosed or non-opportunistic and refuses to succumb to the temptations of surprise inflation. A policy maker's type is his private information, and can only be signalled through the policy maker's behaviour. Opportunistic central bankers may be temporarily deterred from supporting inflationary policies by an incentive to build a reputation for being tough on inflation.
I ask how the reputation of a group of policy makers is related to the characteristics of its individual members, and whether individuals have more or less incentive to gain a reputation for being hard nosed when they are part of a group. 1 I show that there can be more or less reputation building when monetary policy is made by a group, rather than by the chairman alone. The value of a reputation declines, but so does a committee member's payoff to voting individually for inflation when decisions are made by the group as a whole.
The paper provides a framework for asking how the institutional features of central banks influence the incentive of policymaking groups to gain credibility for inflationary toughness. For example, how does the quality of information the public has about individual members of the group affect the equilibrium behaviour of the group? Some central banks publish individual committee members' votes; others do not. I demonstrate that not publishing the votes makes reputation building less attractive. Inflation is higher and social welfare is lower.
Some central banks may face more external pressure to be inflationary. This may lead to compromise inflation being higher than it otherwise would when there is dissension in the policy making committee. I show this can increase or decrease both an opportunistic policy maker's incentive to gain a reputation and social welfare. In some countries, more of an effort may be made to populate central banks with inflation-averse members. I show this has an ambiguous effect on reputation building, but improves social welfare. The culture of some central banks may lead to more importance being attached to the opinions of policy makers who have been in office longer. I show that this effect increases policy makers' incentives to gain a reputation.
My baseline model is inhabited by policy makers serving two-period-long overlapping terms. The policy makers come in two types. This first wants to inflate. This is because with fixed nominal wage contracts and an outstanding stock of nominal government debt, an unanticipated increase in the money supply lowers real wages and improves the government's fiscal situation. If the natural rate of employment is below the socially optimal rate or lump-sum taxes are infeasible and feasible taxes are sufficiently distortionary or costly to administer and 2 Fear of such central bankers has recently led some industrialised countries to adopt inflation targets. (See Bernanke, et. al. (1999) for a description.) In the United Kingdom, for example, the Monetary Policy Committee must meet a 2-1/2 percent inflation target. This does not solve the time inconsistency problem, however, as the Chancellor can change the target whenever he wants. As McCallum (1995) points out, inflation targeting or any other monetary policy contract merely shifts the time-inconsistency problem from the central bank to the enforcing government. comply with, it improves welfare as well. Unfortunately, the central bank cannot systematically fool the public and this leads to an inflation bias without social gain. This is the familiar timeinconsistency problem of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978) . The existence of the first type of central banker may be one reason why inflation has been sub-optimally high in many countries during the post-World-War-II period.
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The second type of central banker might be interpreted as non-opportunistic. McCallum (1995) suggests that some central bankers may recognise the futility of opportunistic behaviour and simply refrain from it. An alternative interpretation is that some central bankers prize price stability above all else. Blinder (1997) suggests that central bankers are inherently inflation averse, saying, "... the noun 'central banker' practically cries out for the adjective 'conservative' (page 14)." The existence of central bankers such as Paul Volcker and Hans Tietmeyer, as well as the recent low inflation in many industrialised countries, suggests that not all central bankers are opportunistic.
If an opportunistic central banker does not vote for inflation in his first period in office, then this increases the private sector's belief that he is not opportunistic. This decreases future expectations of inflation, making future inflationary surprises less costly. Thus, opportunistic policy makers may masquerade as non-opportunistic policy makers during their first term in office to increase the benefit of inflation during their second term.
Models of individual reputation building have been used before to analyse monetary policy. Barro and Gordon (1983b) analyse monetary policy as a repeated game. One outcome is that the central banker does not inflate and the private sector does not expect inflation as long as no one has deviated from this behaviour in the past. A deviation, however, results in the central bank inflating forever after and the private sector expecting this. The model here is more similar to Backus and Driffill's (1985a,b) adaptation of Kreps and Wilson's (1982a) model of reputation and to Vickers (1986) . There, a single strategic policy maker signals he is tough on inflation by acting as a hard-nosed type so that he can later exploit his enhanced reputation. One troubling aspect of these three papers is that the private sector is not assumed to have rational expectations. Instead, the expectations of atomistic private-sector agents are viewed as discretionary actions that can be coordinated in mixed or "punishment" strategies. None of the above papers considers policy making by a group.
In section II, the basic model is described and it is shown how various features of the environment affect equilibrium inflation and welfare. In Section III, I compare decision making in committees with monolithic decision making; I look at the effect of not publishing committee members' votes; I consider the effect of a more hierarchical structure on the outcome. Section IV is the conclusion.
II A Model of Reputation Building in Groups

IIA The Setup
3 Sibert (1999) uses the framework to analyse some of the features of the European Central Bank (ECB). 4 I assume that D and the rest of the structure of the model are common knowledge. 5 Assuming L (in equation (1)) is linear in unanticipated inflation simplifies matters by ensuring policy makers have a dominant strategy in their second period in office.
The underlying macroeconomic framework is a variant of Barro and Gordon (1983a) .
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Social welfare loss is increasing in squared deviations of inflation from its optimal rate of zero and decreasing in unanticipated inflation. Inflation is costly for several reasons. It leads to shoeleather and menu costs; it makes the currency an inconvenient unit of account; it may cause an undesirable redistribution of income; it distorts capital taxes. Unanticipated inflation may be beneficial to society for two reasons. First, if there is nominal wage contracting and the real wage is too high to clear the labour market, it increases employment and output. Second, with an outstanding stock of nominal public debt, it improves the fiscal situation and reduces the need for distortionary or costly taxes. Within-period social welfare loss is written as where B is inflation, is the private sector's subjective expectation of inflation, and is the B e 2 P weight society places on output loss relative to inflation variability. The parameter P plays no role here and is set equal to one.
Monetary policy is made by a committee of members with overlapping terms. Time is discrete and stretches infinitely far into the future. Choosing the simplest scenario, I suppose the committee has two members and each member serves for two periods. Thus, in any period there is a new policy maker who has just taken office and an old policy maker serving his last period.
There are two types of policy makers. The first is non-opportunistic and always votes for zero inflation. The second type wants to minimise social welfare loss. One might imagine various names for the two types; following Margaret Thatcher, Backus and Driffill (1985a) call them "hard nosed" and "wet". I adopt the more recent avian terminology of the British press and refer to them as "hawks" and "doves", respectively. A fraction would choose inflation to be one. This is not necessarily true when his tenure lasts two periods. In his second period in office, he would choose inflation to be one. 5 But, in period one he might choose zero inflation to increase the private sector's belief that he might be a hawk. By strengthening this belief, he would increase the benefit of inflating in period two.
7 Kreps (1990) admits that the use of mixed strategies is "troubling to much of the laity"; he suggests we might think of them as an artifice of a coarse model of reality. In the real world, a policy maker's vote depends on many details known to himself, but unknown to other players, and not built into the model. 8 The Markov restriction rules out repeated-game equilibria where past strategies influence current play % not because they influence the state of the economy % but solely because players believe that past strategies matter. See Maskin and Tirole (1988) for a discussion of the relative merits of Markov and repeated-game equilibria.
With two policy makers, each will vote for inflation of either one or zero.
6 If both prefer the same policy, that policy is implemented. If one policy maker prefers zero and one policy maker prefers one, then some compromise inflation rate, , is implemented, where 0 ]0,1[. " " One possibility is that this rate might be ½ --half the inflation the dissenting dove wants. Or, because the payoff is nonlinear, it might be the rate that gives the opposing dove half the benefit from inflation he wants. Then, , where In Section IIB, I consider
. the effect of the choice of on expected inflation and welfare and in Section IIIC, I allow the " senior policy maker's vote to carry greater weight.
Consider the scenario beginning in period t. The retiring policy maker votes for zero inflation if he is a hawk and for inflation of one if he is a dove. The new policy maker votes for zero inflation if he is a hawk and solves a two-period problem by backwards recursion if he is a dove. The solution is the probability he does not vote for inflation in period t. I refer to this probability as his strategy and I allow mixed strategies, where the probability is between zero and one.
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If the policy maker taking office at t is a dove, he knows he will vote for inflation in period t+1. Expected social welfare loss in t+1 depends on the likelihood is a dove and the 2 t%1 conjectured probability that votes for inflation in period t+1 if he is a dove. Thus, I must 2 t%1 specify how and the private sector believe the actions of affect the strategy of , if he 2 t 2 t 2 t%1 is a dove.
Following Prescott and Townsend (1980) , I restrict attention to equilibria in minimal state or memoryless Markov strategies. That is, I suppose that the strategy of a dove who has just taken office is a time-invariant function of the senior policy maker's type. This variable summarises the current economic environment for the dove. While it is not known to the private sector, it is revealed to the dove when the two policy makers choose inflation; there is no incentive for the senior policy maker to misrepresent his type to his junior colleague. Thus, I suppose that the private sector and conjecture that if the time-t+1 policy maker is a dove, then 2 t the probability he does not vote for inflation in period t+1 is given by , where j is 's type. 2 t Let p denote the private sector's beginning of period t+1 probability assessment that the policy maker who took office at time t is a hawk. Then, the private sector's and 's expectation 2 t of inflation in period t+1 is
(probability 2 t is a dove and 2 t%1 is either a hawk or a dove who does not vote for inflation at t) x " % (probability 2 t is a hawk and 2 t%1 is a dove who votes for inflation at t) x " % (probability 2 t is a dove and 2 t%1 is dove who votes for inflation at t) x 1 '
where the functions A and C are defined by
The function A measures the decrease in time-t+1 expected inflation resulting from an increase in the private sector's belief that is a hawk. If it is believed more likely that will 2 t 2 t%1 vote for zero inflation if is a hawk or for inflation of one if is a dove, then the size of this 2 t 2 t decrease rises. Thus, A is an increasing function of and a decreasing function of .
The private sector updates its beliefs with Bayes' rule. Thus, where denotes the probability votes for zero inflation at time t if he is a dove. N 2 t By equation (4), if the time-t policy maker does not vote for zero inflation, he is revealed as a dove. If votes for zero inflation at time t, the likelihood the private sector attaches to his 2 t being a hawk is decreasing in the probability he votes for inflation in his first period in office, if he is a dove. If doves rarely vote for inflation their first period in office, then observing the junior policy maker vote for zero inflation does little to change the private sector's priors. If doves almost always vote for inflation in their first period in office and a junior policy maker does not, then the private sector will conclude it is likely he is a hawk. In the polar cases, if doves never vote for inflation their first period in office, then observing zero inflation has no effect on the public's priors. If doves always vote for inflation and a policy maker does not, the public will infer he is a hawk.
By equation (1), if the time-t policy maker is a dove, his expected loss in period t+1 is
Prob(2 t%1 is a hawk or a dove who does not vote for inflation) x g(")
% Prob(2 t%1 is a dove who votes for inflation)
Prob(he votes for no inflation) x g(0) % Prob(he votes for inflation)g(") % B
e if 2 t&1 is a hawk
Prob(he votes for no inflation) x g(") % Prob(he votes for inflation) x g(1) % B
e if 2 t&1 is a dove.
The function F does not depend on the actions of . A dove's sole benefit from voting 2 t for zero inflation his first period in office is lower expected inflation his second period in office.
Let i be 's type and be expected inflation at time t. Time-t inflationary 2 t&1 B e expectations are in place when and vote; hence, they treat them as a constant. If the time-t 2 t&1 2 t policy maker is a dove, then by equation (1), his expected welfare loss in period t is Policy makers and society have the same discount factor * 0 ]0,1[. Then, by equations (1) and (4) Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition behind the policy maker's problem is as follows. Current inflationary 9 Sequential in the sense of Prescott and Townsend (1980) .
expectations are already in place and are unaffected by his actions. Thus, if he increases the likelihood that he will vote for no inflation, within-period inflation is more likely to be further below its optimal level than it otherwise would. Expected future welfare rises, however, as expected inflation falls if he actually votes for zero inflation. The latter effect is dampened, but not reversed, as the increased probability of voting for zero inflation causes actually voting for zero inflation to be a poorer signal of being a hawk. Thus, in deciding whether or not to increase his probability of voting for zero inflation, the time-t policy maker trades off a current expected cost against an expected future benefit. As either the discount factor or the prior probability a policy maker is a hawk rises, the future expected benefit becomes relatively more important. The effect of is obvious; that of * D is less so. If a dove votes for inflation in his first period in office, he is revealed to be a dove no matter what prior beliefs are. But, if he does not vote for inflation, the likelihood the private sector attaches to his being a hawk is increasing in the private sector's prior belief that he is a hawk. Hence, the current cost to voting for inflation is unaffected by and the expected future D benefit is increasing in . D If is sufficiently small, then a dove who takes office at time t always votes for inflation * at t. If * and D are sufficiently close to one, then for some values of " and some strategies of the time-t+1 agents, he never votes for inflation at t. Both * and D must be sufficiently large because having a reputation is only important if the policy maker cares about the future and caring about the future is only important if refraining from inflation has a sufficiently large effect on the policy maker's reputation.
If the above sets of conditions are not satisfied, the policy maker follows a mixed strategy. He votes for zero inflation with some probability strictly greater than zero and strictly less than one.
Equilibrium requires that the conjectures of the time-t policy maker and the private sector are consistent. The equilibrium depends on the state of the world because the current loss to a opportunistic policy maker of voting for zero inflation depends on whether the senior policy is a hawk or dove. Only when compromise inflation equals "* and a dissenting dove gets half his desired gain from inflation ( ) is this untrue.
In principle, one may have doves voting for zero inflation their first period in office without assuming hawks exist. The equilibrium strategies are that first-period policy makers do 10 The history-dependent equilibrium in this repeated game violates my assumption that equilibrium strategies are Markov. 11 The central bank has no stabilisation role here. Rogoff (1985) points out that if the central bank has such a role, more conservative central bankers may not improve matters. not vote for inflation and the private sector believes they do not vote for inflation as long as no one has deviated from these strategies in the past. However, if any player deviates from this, all players play non-cooperatively from then on. Thus, policy makers in their first period in office act like hawks because they are afraid they will be punished by the new policy maker next period if they do not. 10 This type of equilibrium is described in Thus if * is sufficiently small, there is a separating equilibrium where doves always vote for inflation their first period in office and hawks never do. If is sufficiently close to one and D 2 * " is not too small, there is a pooling equilibrium where no policy maker votes for inflation in his first period in office. Compromise inflation cannot be too small because this makes the current cost to not voting for inflation too large if the senior policy maker is a dove.
For other values of the parameters there are semi-separating equilibria where hawks never vote for inflation in their first period in office and doves randomise between voting for inflation and not voting for inflation. As an example, suppose . Then ensures " ' 1/2 * # 1/4 doves always vote for inflation and ensures junior policy makers never vote for D 2 * $ 3/4 inflation.
Consider an increase in . This might result from a deliberate attempt by society to D appoint conservative central bankers. The higher is D, the greater the likelihood the private sector attaches to the junior time-t policy maker being a hawk if they observe him vote for zero inflation at time t. Thus, it might seem that the probability an opportunistic junior policy maker votes for zero inflation should be increasing in D. Surprisingly, this is not the case; however, an increase in D must improve welfare. Figure 1 ; the proof of the second is found in the Appendix. Figure 1 shows the impact of D when * = .8 and " = "*. In this case, .
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Proposition 4. An increase in the fraction of the population made up by hawks, D, has an ambiguous effect on the probability an opportunistic junior policy maker votes for inflation and increases expected welfare.
Proof. The first result is demonstrated in
D
The intuition is as f o l l o w s . A n increase in D raises the belief that 2 t is a hawk if he votes for zero inflation at t, but it has an ambiguous effect on the fall in expected inflation associated with this change in perception. To see this, suppose it were known that 2 t%1 will vote for inflation. Then, an increase in p % the likelihood that is a hawk % increases the 2 t likelihood time-t+1 inflation will be ", rather than one. If it were known that will not vote 2 t%1 for inflation, an increase in p increases the probability time-t+1 inflation will be zero, rather than ". This benefit will be smaller than the previous one if " is less than one half. A rise in D increases the likelihood will not vote for inflation, and thus it can lower the decrease in 2 t%1 expected inflation associated with the increase in p.
If this occurs, it is possible for the rise in D to cause the probability an opportunistic 2 t votes for inflation to rise. However, the effect on welfare is unambiguous. The direct effect on inflation of a decline the percentage of policy makers who are opportunistic causes expected social welfare loss to decline.
I now consider a change in the compromise level of inflation, ". This might be the result of a vociferous press or government which puts pressure on the central bank to inflate.
Proposition 5. If the junior policy maker is a dove, then an increase in " causes the probability he votes for zero inflation to fall (rise) if the senior policy maker is a hawk (dove). An increase in " can raise or lower social welfare.
Proof. See the Appendix for the proof of the first part of the proposition. Figure 2 demonstrates the second part.
An increase in compromise inflation increases the junior policy maker's benefit to voting for inflation if the senior policy maker is a hawk and decreases it if the senior policy maker is a dove. Surprisingly, Figure 2 (drawn for the case of * = .9and D = .5) shows that the decline in the likelihood that a junior policy maker votes for inflation when the senior policy maker is a dove can be large enough that an increase in compromise inflation can increase welfare.
III Reputation and the Characteristics of Central Banks
In this section, I analyse how some characteristics of central banks affect the incentive to build a reputation, and hence, inflation and welfare.
IIIA Committees vs. Monolithic Decision Making
Central banks in countries such as the US, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Italy are dominated by the chairman. Policy is effectively made by a single individual. This is not true in Japan and is unlikely to be true for the European Central Bank (ECB). In this section I compare the outcomes when policy is made by a chairman and when policy is made by a committee.
Suppose that instead of a committee, policy is made by a non-overlapping sequence of two period-lived decision makers. A opportunistic policy maker who takes office in period t solves a two-period problem by backward recursion.
In period t+1, expected inflation is one if he chooses inflation in period t and 1 & P(N) if he does not, where N is the probability he chooses inflation in period t and P is as defined in equation (4). Thus, his expected loss in period t+1 is By equations (1) and (10), his discounted expected loss in period t is where variables the policy maker treats as constants are ignored.
Differentiating equation (11) (12) 
The intuition is similar to that behind the result in Proposition 2. Proposition 7. If the discount factor is sufficiently small, policy making by committee produces no higher inflation than and is at least as good as policy making by a single decision maker. If the discount factor and the prior belief that policy makers are hawks are both sufficiently close to one and " is sufficiently close to "*, a single policy maker produces no higher inflation than and is at least as good as policy making by committee.
Proof. See the Appendix.
When decision making is done by committee, a vote by the time-t policy maker to inflate has only a partial effect on inflation. Thus, the output gain is less than if he could unilaterally decide on inflation equal to one. Therefore, inflating produces less short-term gain and this tends to lower the incentive of the policy maker to vote for inflation. However, if he votes to inflate, it has less of an effect on next-period's expectation of inflation. Thus, gaining a reputation is less important. This long-term gain tends to increase the incentive of the policy makers to vote for 12 Policy makers do not attempt to influence outcomes after their retirement. 13 It is straight forward to show the results in this section hold for , but the notation "'1/2 is messy.
inflation. The latter effect is more important when the discount rate is high and when the prior belief the policy maker is a hawk is high.
As an example, suppose " = 0.5. Then if * < 0.25, doves always vote for inflation in both regimes. If 0.25 < * < 0.5, doves always vote for inflation when they are the sole policy maker, but they do not always vote for inflation when they are part of a committee. If * > 0.75/D 2 , then doves never vote for inflation in their first period in office in either regime. If 0.5/D 2 < * < 0.75/D 2 , then doves never vote for inflation if they are the sole policy maker. But, they sometimes do if they are part of a committee.
IIIB Equilibrium when votes are published with a lag
The Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and the US Federal Reserve publish the votes of individual members. The ECB, however, does not plan to publish the votes of its members until 17 years have passed.
In this section I suppose society considers the experiment of not publishing the votes of committee members until after their retirement
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. As a simple example, I suppose that the time-t votes are not published until after the time-t+1 inflation decision is made. Thus, when the private sector is forming its expectation of time-t+1 inflation, they know time-t inflation and all votes dated time-t-1 and earlier. Thus, it knows how the policy maker who took office in period t-1 voted at time t-1. I also assume
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. Thus, the probability that dovish junior policy makers " ' "( taking office other than at time t vote for inflation does not depend on the senior policy maker's type.
There are three possible states of the world at time t. First, the policy maker who took office at time may be a dove and may have revealed this by voting for inflation at . Call t&1 t&1 this type of timepolicy maker d*. Second, the policy maker who took office at time t&1 t&1 may be a dove, but may not have voted for inflation at ; this type is called d. Finally, the t&1 policy maker may be type h. If the timepolicy maker is type d*, then not publishing the t&1 time-t vote does not matter; the actions of the policy maker who takes office at time t are revealed. Now consider the case where does not vote for inflation at time . If time-t 2 t&1 t&1 inflation is one, then it is revealed that the time-t policy maker is a dove. The actions of future policy makers will be unchanged by the one-time experiment and this is known by both the private sector and . Thus, time-t+1 expected inflation is (where the function is 2 t B e (0,N,N) B e defined in equation (2)). If time-t inflation is zero, then it is known that the time-t policy maker voted for zero inflation and time-t+1 expected inflation is , where is the B (4), the public believes that is type 2 t&1 2 t h with probability
ü '
Prob (2 
where
The notational dependence of x on t is suppressed. Proceeding as in Section II and using the definitions of g and "*, 's expected loss in 2 t period t is where the timepolicy maker is type i and variables the policy maker treats as constants are t&1 ignored. ( ' A((N,N) A( Not publishing the votes does not affect time-t+1 expected welfare. On average, the private sector continues to guess inflation correctly and the actions of the time-t+1 policy makers are unchanged. However, average inflation in period t rises.
IIIC. Inflation when the bank is hierarchical
It may be unreasonable to suppose that all policy makers have equal weight in voting. New policy makers may be less sure of themselves or the central bank's culture may give more weight to senior policy makers. In this section, I look at the effect of giving the senior policy maker's vote more importance. Formally, if both policy makers vote for the same policy, that policy is enacted. If the senior policy maker votes for inflation and the junior policy maker does not, inflation of " + , is enacted. If the junior policy maker votes for inflation and the senior policy maker does not, a policy of " -, is enacted.
Proceeding as in Section II, a sequential Nash equilibrium with Bayesian updating is a pair { } such that N h ,N d Suppose that initially " = "*. Then consider an experiment where the senior policy maker is given slightly more weight. If doves vote for inflation their first period in office with probability zero or one, there is no effect. But, if they have a mixed strategy, the probability of voting for inflation declines. The intuition is straightforward. The cost of building a reputation declines because less weight is put on a junior policy maker's vote for zero inflation. The benefit of building a reputation rises because more weight is put on a vote for inflation when the policy maker is senior. Thus, dovish junior policy makers are less apt to vote for inflation their first period in office.
Inflation is higher when the senior policy maker is a dove and the junior policy maker does not vote for inflation and lower when the senior policy maker is a hawk and the junior policy maker votes for inflation. However, the welfare cost of the higher inflation in the former case is outweighed by the lower inflation in the latter case and the greater propensity of dovish junior policy makers to oppose inflation.
IV Conclusion
Macroeconomic analyses of central bank decision making typically treat the monetary authority as a single entity. In reality, monetary policy is typically made by a committee. Thus, the reputation of the central bank is jointly determined with the reputations of the individual commi-ttee members. Institutional rules affecting the way members interact and the observability of indi-vidual actions affect members' incentives to build reputations, and hence, inflation and welfare.
This paper attempts to build a simple model of reputation building when monetary policy is made by a group. I use the model to analyse how some of the institutional features of central banks can be expected to influence incentives to maintain a reputation, inflation, and welfare.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Differentiating equation (7) yields By equation (2) and P(N) + NP'(N) = P(N) 2 (from equation (4)),
By equations (4) and (20), ; hence the second-order conditions for minima M 2 ü/MN 2 > 0 are satisfied and the right-hand-side of equation (20) 
S is a continuous mapping from a compact, convex set into itself; hence Brouwer's Theorem ensures a fixed point which solves (21) exists. This implies an equilibrium exists.
(27)
)y
)
where the subscript i = h,d denotes a partial derivative with respect to This ensures y i . ) :' Therefore, the equilibrium is unique. 
Substituting (23) and (32) into (31) yields Thus, is increasing in ,. N i Substituting (9) evaluated at " = "* into (33) and (3) into the result yields As in (25), the expected cost of inflation is Differentiating (35), evaluating at and substituting in (34) yields that this cost is ,'0 decreasing iff The LHS of (36) is linear in D; hence this is true if Using the definition of "*, it is easy to verify both of the LHSs in (37) are strictly increasing in y*. Thus, (37) holds if it holds at . This is true. y( ' 1
